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THE ANATOMY OF COLLUSION*
abstract
Received models of cooperative action overlook the way that the social environment itself features in 
collective intentions; recognising the divergent ways that norms function can help explain how people 
collaborating covertly are not considered irrational even though the things they are doing are totally 
contrary to the principles and convictions they sustain as individual agents.
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THE ANATOMY OF COLLUSION
“Collusion” is often used to express opprobrium when describing couples or groups 
cooperating covertly or secretly to achieve aims that those agents themselves may recognise 
as morally dubious. Collusion of the sort analysed here is inherently social: the individuals 
involved would not venture to pursue such ends entirely on their own, because the particular 
strategies employed could not be executed rationally except as joint efforts or through 
surreptitious teamwork, nor would these endeavours be reasonable to attempt without the 
expectation of cooperation or tacit consent of others. Collusion occurs within and across 
hierarchical divisions; for example suppose the candidacy of a worthy applicant with short 














My aim here is to illuminate and account for the apparent divergence of collusion from 
other sorts of rational collaboration, but not so as to cast it in a unique light or as an isolated 
category of collective endeavour. On the contrary, I hope to show how the social environment 
itself may contribute directly to rationally cooperative intentional behaviour1 of many sorts, 






































and associates all the participants involved with each other’s intentions and expectations 
(Bratman 1993, p. 109, 1999; Chant and Ernst 2008; Gilbert 1990 and 2014; Kutz 2000, p. 6; 
Searle 2008; Tuomela 2003). On other accounts, participants are attributed with knowledge 
























relies upon the resiliency of the very institutional structures which participants in the 
collusion betray (actively or passively). For example, it is only because colluding committee 
members know that job interviews are generally regarded as reliable and fair threshold 











and sub-plans of other individuals involved in a collective covert operation at a particular 
time, or indeed to hold impersonal generalisations about others involved in a collusion. 
Consider the overseeing scrutineer who played the most crucial part in the sabotage of the 
short interviewee. He knew that looking the other way was just what he was expected to do, 
but not because he held true propositional beliefs describing any specific expectations or 

















and the inept nephew’s getting hired would not be interpreted correctly as the convergent 





















People in collusion may be committed to an outcome that none of them would pursue without 
the others’ commitment or endorsement, yet not because they share thoughts with any 
specifiable content which constitutes the object of shared commitment or tacit consent. Nor 




that a collective intentional action is gauged or calibrated as rational in light of many different 
kinds of norms. These considerations independently support Chiodelli and Moroni (2014) in 


































by assiduously contouring her handling of applicants’ portfolios in light of statutory rules 
was she effective in meeting her own ends, commensurate with the covert in-house legacy 
of excluding short people – the mischief was made possible because of, yet in defiance of, 






attitudes that distinguishes between our believing an expressible proposition, and our accepting 
something as a policy in the course of practical reasoning. To this we can add Chiodelli and 
Moroni’s (2014) depiction of the Contean nomotropic nature of rationality. Collusion seems 




We have just observed that the rational coherence of professing a principle T while colluding 
with others in behaviour that defeats T, rests on the fact that an agent may make choices 



























norms as features 



















I commit no logical inconsistency through my intentional display of rudeness or my covert 
sabotage, because the component thoughts comprising my intentionally nasty behaviour 








or norm as rational is always relative to distinct “contexts of legitimacy” that preclude the 
agent’s individual encounter with what she is doing or with the norms she is following (or 
flouting) in their propositional formulation.4 The force of legitimacy of a norm may vanish 
with a change in the social environment, not because anyone has changed their propositional 
beliefs about short people. For example the covert legitimacy and so too the incentive for 
shunning short people may disintegrate if there is a change in the economy and there emerge 
plenty of jobs to go around.
We noticed already that it can be the factual features of the social environment itself that a 
rational agent must negotiate and which impel conformity on rational grounds. And we saw 




















sometimes entail acceptance of a policy which provides the agent a rationally discernible 
advantage – not because the content of beliefs summoned as the overt basis for that policy are 
true, nor because such beliefs are derived from the agent’s avowed principles for right living, 






























































collective utility, it might be inversely proportional: the less there is of neutral and impartial 
evidence available in P’s favour, the more its collective utility increases. P’s collective 
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